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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: SUPREME COURT
HOLDS STATES CANNOT RESTRICT AUTHORIZED
ACTIVITIES OF NONLAWYER PATENT OFFICE
PRACTITIONER
STATE efforts to restrict the rights of laymen practitioners before
federal administrative agencies received a significant setback in
the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Sperry v. Florida
ex rel. Florida Bar.1 The Court ruled that the supremacy clause
of the Constitution prevented the states from prohibiting a nonlaw-
yer registered patent agent from engaging in activities authorized
by the Commissioner of Patents.
Sperry, a registered practitioner before the United States Patent
Office, but not a member of any state bar, was charged by the Florida
Bar with engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Florida.2
Admitting he had no right to practice law generally, Sperry an-
swered in defense that he confined his work to proceedings involved
in patent practice which were presented to or authorized by the
Patent Office. However, relying on precedent3 and express constitu-
tional power,4 the Florida Supreme Court held that Sperry's activi-
ties constituted unauthorized practice of law which the state could
forbid, and that neither federal statutes nor the United States
Constitution empowered any branch of the government to authorize
such practice in Florida. The court thereupon issued a summary
decree permanently enjoining Sperry from pursuing patent work in
Florida, unless and until he became a member of the state bar.6
1373 U.S. 379 (1963) (Warren, C.J.) (unanimous decision).
-1140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 579 (1963), 17 U. MIAaM L. REV. 409
(1963), 14 W. Ryas. L. REv. 373 (1963).
3In Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1953), the Florida Supreme
Court had held that "those who hold themselves out to practice in any field or
phase of law must be members of the Florida Bar...." Petitioner, licensed to prac-
tice before the United States Tax Court and the Treasury Department, sought, but was
denied, permission to practice federal tax law in Florida.
The court also cited Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 I1. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519
(1949); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); and West Virginia State Bar
v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
" FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 23 (1956): "The supreme court shall have exclusive juris-
diction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted .... See also 31 FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, art.
II, § 2 (1956): "No person shall engage in any way in the practice of law in this
state unless such person is an active member of The Florida Bar ...."
'140 So. 2d at 596. Sperry was enjoined from calling himself a patent attorney
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In reversing, the Supreme Court did not question Florida's
determination that Sperry's activities consituted the practice of law
in Florida.0 Furthermore, it did not doubt that Florida has a sub-
stantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state
which, in the absence of contrary federal legislation, could be exer-
cised to prevent this circumscribed form of patent practice by non-
lawyers.7 Instead the Court based its decision on the determination
that all power as to patents has been delegated to Congress, 8 that
Congress has expressly authorized the Commissioner of Patents to
permit practice before the Patent Office by nonlawyers,9 and that
the Commissioner has explicitly exercised this delegated authority.10
The Court concluded that unless Congress had qualified its authori-
zation, Florida was barred by the supremacy clause from imposing
any additional requirements on persons who functioned within the
scope of the federal license."'
The State of Florida contended that the federal authorization
must be qualified by an implication that such practice should be
or holding himself out to be an attorney at law in Florida; from giving legal
opinions, including opinions as to patentability or infringement on patent rights; from
preparing, drafting, and construing legal documents; from preparing and prosecuting
applications for letters patent and amendments thereto, or from holding himself out
as qualified to do the same, while in Florida; and from engaging in the practice of law.
0373 U.S. at 383. Citing Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947), and
Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874), the Court further noted that
Patent Office work required the practitioner to advise his clients as to patent-
ability, to draft the specifications and claims, and to prepare amendments in the
application, when such are necessary.
7 373 U.S. at 383. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961); Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn.
468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
a U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power .. .To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
o 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1958): "The Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce, may prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the
Patent Office, and may require them, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, to show that they are of good moral character and reputa-
tion and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the office." (Emphasis added.)
10 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 1.341-.348 (1960). In § 1.31 the Commissioner declares, "An
applicant for patent may file and prosecute his own case, or he may be represented by
an attorney or agent authorized to practice before the Patent Office in patent cases."
(Emphasis added.) Section 1.341(b) describes who may be an agent: "Any citizen of
the United States not an attorney at law who fulfills the requirements and complies
with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
Office and have his name entered on the register of agents."
1 373 U.S. at 385. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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consistent with state law.' 2 However, after examining the legislative
history and the development of the Patent Office rules and regula-
tions, the Court held that Congress intended to give nonlawyer
agents the right to practice before the Office whether or not the
state would otherwise prohibit such conduct.'8 Upon finding this
intent, the Court decided that Congress had not exceeded the power
necessary and proper to confer patent rights and that the legislative
grant required the Patent Office to maintain standards high enough
so as to avoid the criticism of improper delegation of congressional
power to an administrative agency.' 4
Regulation of the practice of law in the public interest by the
sovereign dates back to Roman Civilization."5 In the United States,
this duty has generally been assumed by the states as a part of their
police power 6 or as a power inherent in the judiciary.'7 Important
2Though the Florida brief was not available its arguments have been recon-
structed from other sources. See vom Baur, Oral Argument in Florida State Bar v.
Sperry, 29 U.P. NEws 20 (1963). Basically, Florida presented three arguments: (1) states
have the right to control and regulate the practice of law; (2) statutory construction
showed that Congress had never attempted to authorize nonlawyer practitioners to
practice law relating to patents within the states, but only physically before the
Patent Office; (3) if the statutes were construed to give nonlawyer practitioners the
right to practice within the state, this would be unconstitutional as an invasion of
the police powers of the state.
2" 373 U.S. at 388. In summing up the legislative history, the Court stated: "Exam-
ination of the development of practice before the Patent Office and its governmental
regulation reveals that: (1) nonlawyers have practiced before the Office from its incep-
tion, with the express approval of the Patent Office and to the knowledge of Congress;
(2) during prolonged congressional study of unethical practices before the Patent Office,
the right of nonlawyer agents to practice before the Office went unquestioned, and
there was no suggestion that abuses might be curbed by state regulation; (3) despite
protests of the bar, Congress in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act refused to
limit the right to practice before the administrative agencies to lawyers; and (4) the
Patent Office has defended the value of nonlawyer practitioners while taking steps to
protect the interests which a State has in prohibiting unauthorized practice of law."
The Court recognized that "the authority of Congress is no less when the state
power which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary
rather than by the state legislature." Id. at 403.
" See note 9 supra. In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 32 (1958) provides authority for
suspending or dismissing agents for disreputable practice, gross misconduct, or failure
to comply with the Patent Office rules, while 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1958) sets a fine of up
to $1,000 for each offense where a person holds himself out to practice or who
practices before the Patent Office without being an enrolled agent.
1 vom Baur, Practice Before Administrative Agencies and the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, 15 Fn. B.J. 103 (1955). See POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
Tmxms 51 (1953).10E.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949);
Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men
v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
17E.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 II. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941,
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937); In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607. 194
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policy reasons such as protecting the public from incompetent and
unreliable advice, preserving and strengthening the lawyer-client
relationship, and maintaining law as the foundation of government,
necessitate restricting the practice of law.18 Although the courts have
not been able to agree on a definition of practice of law, nonlawyers
have been banned from activities ranging from the drawing of wills
to claims-adjusting.19
Layman practice before governmental agencies is probably the
area of greatest contention in the present day controversy over un-
authorized practice of law.20 State courts have frequently enjoined
authorized practice by nonlawyers before state agencies on the
ground that such authorization is a legislative encroachment on the
judicial domain.21 On the other hand, efforts to enjoin nonlawyer
N.E. 313 (1935); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937); West Virginia
State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
"8E.g., West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 527, 109 S.E.2d 420,
435 (1959): "The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons who
are not admitted to the bar .. . is . . . the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified and undisciplined persons
over whom the judicial department of the government could exercise slight or no
control."
See Adler, The Bar's Campaign Against Unauthorized Practice, 11 ARK. L. Rv.
320 (1957). See generally OTRBouRO, A STUDY OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIcE OF LAW
1-26 (1951); vom Baur, supra note 15.
Bar associations have in recent years taken the lead in instituting unauthorized
practice litigation. See Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, a Struggle
Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. Rv. 1 (1955). In 1938 there were approximately
480 bar association committees on unauthorized practice. Otterbourg, Collection
Agency Activities: The Problem From the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 35 (1938). Probably there are more such committees today. The American Bar
Association has had an unauthorized practice committee since 1930 and publishes a
quarterly bulletin, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIcE NEWS.
The bar's activities have often caused bad public relations, because the public
sees them merely as efforts to enforce a monopoly. Llewelleyn, The Bar's Troubles,
and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAw &, CONTEMP. PROB. 104 (1938): "The problem of
unauthorized practice of law is a problem of using the processes of the law to define
and protect a monopoly." See also Johnstone, supra.
"°E.g., People ex tel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931) (wills); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Lesser, 68 R.I.
14, 26 A.2d 6 (1942) (claims-adjusting). See Annots., 111 A.L.R. 19 (1937); 125 A.L.R.
1173 (1940); 151 A.L.R. 781 (1944); and 33 WORDS AND PHRASFS 193 (perm. ed. 1940),
for a general survey as to what constitutes the practice of law.
"See Bennett, Non-Lawyers and the Practice of Law Before State and Federal
Agencies, 46 A.B.A.J. 705 (1960); Robinson, Appearances by Laymen in a Representa-
tive Capacity Before Administrative Bodies, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 89 (1938); The
Practice of Non-Lawyers Before Administrative Agencies, 15 FED. B.J. 99-185, 211-36
(1955).
2'People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937)
(Illinois Industrial Commission); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504,
109 S.E.2d 420 (1959) (state Compensation Commission); State ex tel. State Bar v.
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practice before federal administrative agencies usually have been
frustrated by the recognition and acceptance of the federal govern-
ment's power to regulate its own agencies. 22 However, the Florida
court in Sperry ruled out such practice by nonlawyer patent practi-
tioners,23 thus presenting a clear challenge to federal control of prac-
tice before its administrative agencies.
The Supreme Court's straightforward response to Florida's
challenge offers scant opportunity for criticism. On the basis of
statutory construction alone, supported by an analysis of the legisla-
tive history and the development of the Patent Office rules, the
decision seems almost self-evident. Moreover, the decision is but-
tressed by several strong policy arguments.
One underlying consideration which strongly influenced the
Court was fear of the disruptive effect which the decision below
threatened to have upon Patent Office proceedings.24 This considera-
tion has substantial merit. Had the Court upheld this decision,
apptoximately half of the present Patent Office agents in the country
would be disqualified. 25 Replacing these practitioners would be ex-
tremely difficult since patent work is a specialized field which re-
Keller,r 16 Wis.2d 377, 114 N.W.2d 796 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 102
(1963) (state Public Service Commission).22 Schroeder v. Wheeler, 126 Cal. App. 367, 14 P.2d 903 (1932) (Patent Office):
Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S.E.2d 345 (1957) (Treasury and Tax Court):
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949) (Patent
Office); DePass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940) (ICC);
Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 604, 53 A.2d 800, 803 (1948) (NLRB),
Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 534-35,
78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 218 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (Treasury and
Tax Court) (by implication); Sharp v. Mida's Research Bureau, Inc., 45 N.Y.S.2d 690
(1943), affd, 267 App. Div. 980, 48 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1944) (Patent Office); Battelle Memo-
rial Institute v. Green, 133 U.S.P.Q. 49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (Patent Office).
28 See note 5 supra. Cf. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 318 111. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d
519 (1949) (patent agent enjoined). For other cases restricting patent agents see
People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 Pac. 349 (1908);
Application of Plantamura, 22 Conn. Supp. 213, 166 A.2d 859 (1960), affd, 149 Conn.
111, 176 A.2d 61 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 872 (1962); Marshall v. New Inventor's
Club, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio C.P. 1953). Contra, Schroeder v. Wheeler, 126 Cal.
App. 367, 14 P.2d 903 (1932); Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, 133 U.S.P.Q. 49
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp.
792 (D. Del. 1954); Sharp v. Mida's Research Bureau, Inc., 45 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1943),
aff'd, 267 App. Div. 980, 48 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1944).
21373 U.S. at 401-02.
25The Government in an amicus curiae brief noted that, as of November, 1962,
of the 7,544 persons registered to practice before the Patent Office, 1,801 were not
lawyers, and 1,687 others were not lawyers admitted to the bar of the state in which
they were practicing. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 3. Sixty-two of
seventy-three patent practitioners in Florida were not members of the Florida Bar.
373 U,S. at 401 n.44.
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quires scientific and technical qualifications often not possessed boy
lawyers. 26
Furthermore the Court did not believe there was any substance
to Florida's concern that unskilled and unethical practitioners might
victimize her citizens.27 The Florida Supreme Court had admitted
in its opinion that its decision in no way was meant to imply that
Sperry was unskilled, but only that he did not qualify under Flori-
da's laws.28 It would seem clear that Florida's speculative fears are
hardly sufficient reason to justify interference with federal patent
agents in light of the rigid standards and safeguards provided by the
Patent Office rules for regulating those who practice before it.29
Therefore, layman practice before the Patent Office would not un-
fairly prejudice the states in their efforts to effectuate the policy
reasons justifying the restriction of the practice of law. .,.
Peculiarly absent from the Sperry opinion was any real attempt
by the Court to analyze the right of Congress or the Patent Office
to decide who may practice before the agency. Although this was
the very foundation on which Sperry's argument rested, the Court
merely assumed that this right existed. 0 It might have been con-
tended that Congress and the federal agencies are invading a basi-
cally judicial area when they permit practice by nonlawyers, and
hence, that the courts can prevent such practice.31 This conceptu-
20 See United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586 (1889). The investigation of patent
claims "requires the intelligent judgment of a trained body of skilled officials, expert
in the various branches of science and art ... 
27 373 U.S. at 402.
-11140 So. 2d at 595.
20 Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(c) (1960), any person seeking to practice before the
Patent Office must establish "that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patents valuable service, and is otherwise compe-
tent to advise and assist them in the preparation and prosecution of their applications
before the Patent Office."
The Court noted that "failure to comply with these standards may result in
suspension or disbarment. 35 U.S.C. § 32; 37 C.F.R. § 1.348." 373 U.S. at 402. See
Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949) (disbarment of practitioner for misconduct).
See generally Note, Admission to Practice Before and Disbarment From Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 12 SmAcusE L. REv. 477 (1961).
20373 U.S. at 403. See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 US.
117 (1926) (upholding right of an agency to prescribe procedure for admission of
practitioners).
""This argument was suggested in a philosophical brief filed as amici curiae on
behalf of the state bar associations. Florida did not adopt this position, and it was
not presented in oral argument.
Perhaps, however, the Court alluded to it in passing: "We have not overlooked
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alistic argument, which is based on a strict separation of powers
theory, has been used by many state courts in striking down legisla-
tively or administratively conferred rights of nonlawyers to practice
before agencies. 32  The fundamental premise is that only lawyers
may practice law, and attempts by any branch of the government to
authorize nonlawyers to practice law may be invalidated by the
courts through their inherent judicial power. According to this
argument, the Supreme Court, having accepted Florida's determina-
tion that Sperry's activities constituted the practice of law, could
have similarly drawn upon its inherent power to prevent the instant
encroachment by the Patent Office into the judicial realm.
However, had Florida pressed this point, it is unlikely the Su-
preme Court would have reached a contrary decision. The same
policy considerations-fear of disruption in Patent Office proceed-
ings and the belief that adequate standards are enforced in that
Office-which justified preventing Florida's interference with the
Patent Office procedure would also apply to preclude such interfer-
ence by the federal courts, even though nonlawyer patent practi-
tioners might be considered to be practicing law. A few state courts
have shown restraint by not invalidating state legislative authoriza-
tions permitting practice by nonlawyer agents unless there has been
some harmful activity or abuse.33 Also, previous decisions of the
Supreme Court upholding the authority of the Patent Office to
determine the qualifications of those who appear before it indicate
the Court's unwillingess to assert its judicial power unnecessarily
into the basically legislative domain of federal agencies.34
Although Sperry was concerned only with practice before the
Patent Office, perhaps the greatest significance of the case is the
reasonable expectation that its rationale will be applied to other
respondent's constitutional arguments, but find them singularly without merit." 373
US. at 403. See Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of
Inherent judicial Power, 28 U. CHm. L. REv. 162 (1960). See generally Dowling, The
Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935).
82 See cases cited in notes 17 and 21 supra.
33 See Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650, 196 So. 725 (1940);
Bessemer Bar Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 239 Ala. 663, 196 So. 733 (1940); Cowern v. Nelson,
207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington
Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952). See generally Comment, supra
note 31.
"'See United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 (1899); Goldsmith v. United States Bd.
of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Gellhorn, Cincinnati Conference on Law and
Lawyers in the Modern World, 15 U. CINe. L. REv. 127, 196 (1941).
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federal agencies. In a case decided only two weeks after Sperry,35
the Supreme Court extended the holding in the instant case to
practice before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which has
rules and regulations similar to those of the Patent Office and re-
quires practitioners trained in technical traffic and transportation
skills as well as in law.36 But unlike the Patent Office, which specifi-
cally directs that most of its work be carried on by mail,3 7 the ICC
conducts frequent hearings of an advocacy nature which under its
rules are open to agents and attorneys alike.38 Advocacy is one area
which lawyers have traditionally regarded as their own legitimate
monopoly, and despite the Court's apparent acquiescence in advo-
cacy by nonlawyers, this problem will probably remain a continuing
source of friction.
Practice before the Treasury Department and the United States
Tax Court present other friction areas in the field of unauthorized
practice of law. Treasury Department and Tax Court rules allow
non-attorneys a wide range of practice before them.39 The Secretary
of the Treasury issued an official interpretation of the departmental
rules in 1956, directing that "all persons enrolled to practice before
it [the Treasury Department] be permitted to fully represent their
clients before it."40 Despite this interpretation, the California Court
85 Keller v. Wisconsin ex rel. State Bar, 374 U.S. 102 (1963), vacating and remanding
per curiam 16 Wis.2d 377, 114 N.W.2d 796 (1962). Petitioner had been enjoined by
the state from appearing as an advocate for others before public agencies, including
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
I" See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-.13 (1962); Konigsberg, Examination of Non-Lawyers for
Admission to Practice Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 17 ICC PRACT. J.
503 (1950).
17 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1960).
38See 49 C.F.R. § 1.5(b) (1962). See generally Singer, Practice of Non-Lawyers
Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 15 FED. B.J. 177 (1955).
OD See 31 C.F.R. § 10 (1959) (Treasury Department); 26 C.F.R. § 701.2 (1961) (Tax
Court); Kilpatrick, Treasury Department Practice, 15 FED. B.J. 132 (1955); Phillips,
Practice Before the Tax Court of the United States, 15 FED. B.J. 143 (1955); Comment,
What Is the "Practice of Law?"--a Commentary on the Tax Practice Controversy,
36 U. DaT. L.J. 464 (1959).
,021 Fed. Reg. 833 (1956). The purpose of the official interpretation was to make
it clear that enrolled agents were to have the same rights and duties as an enrolled
attorney. Carey, AIA's Carey Holds Treasury Interpretation Protects CPAs in Treasury
Practice, 5 J. TAXATION 42 (1956).
But see Clark, Treasury's Interpretation of Circular 230 Raises New Doubts on
Practice by Accountants, 4 J. TAXATION 216 (1956); Correa, AIA's Council Sees No
Difficulty With Treasury's Statement; Disagrees With Clark, 4 J. TAXATION 219 (1956);
Clark, State Courts' Interest in Treasury Practice Cannot Be Ignored-A Reply to
Mr. Correa, 4 J. TAXATION 306 (1956).
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of Appeals later the same year in Agran v. Shapiro4' held that enroll-
ment before the Treasury Department did not authorize one to
perform acts connected therewith which constituted the practice of
law in California. Although a different agency was involved in
Agran, the situation is closely analogous to Sperry, and it would
seem likely that the Sperry holding would control to prevent such
state interference.
Even though extension of Sperry to other federal agencies ap-
pears likely, it does not follow that, whenever activities involve
federal subject matter, the states have no power to regulate them.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that admittance to prac-
tice before a federal district court does not give a person the right
to practice generally within the district without being a member of
the state bar, even if the practice is limited to the federal courts.42
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court refused to interfere
for want of a federal question, in contrast to its reaction in Sperry
when restrictions were placed on federal agency practice. This is
not an inconsistent result because, except for the District of Colum-
bia, federal courts have customarily followed the requirements of
states in admitting persons to practice before them.48 These federal
courts have no procedure of their own for determining either the
legal ability or moral character of their practitioners.4 4 Also, the
compelling policy reasons of nation-wide uniformity of practice and
the fear of disruption of settled and accepted procedures are not so
involved in federal court practice as they are in the case of federal
agency practice.
Generally Congress has made each agency responsible for polic-
ing its own ranks, a job the agency is probably best qualified to do.
For this reason, at least in agencies where procedures and precau-
"25 J. TAXATiON 272 (App. Div. Super. Ct. 1956), affirming 127 Cal. App.2d 807,
273 P.2d 619 (1954), 68 HAXv. L. REv. 376 (1954), 33 N.C.L. REv. 252 (1955), 80
N.Y.U.L. REv. 492 (1955). But see Crane-Johnson Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 740
(8th Cir. 1939). See generally Clark, New Agran Decision Raises Constitutional Ques-
tions; Confuses Rules of Tax Practice, 5 J. TAXAnON 271 (1956). Because the case was
believed to fall short as a satisfactory base on which to adjudicate finally the position
of certified public accountants in Treasury practice, no appeal was taken to the
United States Supreme Court. Editorial, The Agran Case in Perspective, 102 J. Ac-
COUNTANCY 29, 30-31 (Dec. 1956).
42 Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed per curiam,
358 U.S. 52 (1958), 72 HA~v. L. REv. 580 (1959), 107 U. PA. L. REv. 404 (1959).
is See In re Issenian, 345 U.S. 286, 287 (1953). But see Theard v. United States,
354 U.S. 278 (1957).
"See In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68, 69 (Sd Cir. 1958).
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dons similar to those of the Patent Office are followed,45 the Court
will likely apply the supremacy clause to prevent state hindrance
of federal agency practice. Otherwise a practitioner's rights would
hinge on geography, and uniformity of practice before the agencies
would be destroyed. When confronted by these powerful counter-
vailing policy considerations, fine-spun definitions of the practice of
law and abstract theorizing about inherent judicial power are inade-
quately adapted to the solution of many of the conflicts in the
penumbra occupied by both lawyer and layman practitioners.
10 In addition to the Treasury Department (Internal Revenue), 23 Stat. 258 (1884),
5 U.S.C. § 261 (1958); 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.94 (1959); the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 54 Stat. 913 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17 (12) (1958); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-.13 (1962);
and the Patent Office, 35 U.S.C. §§ 31-33 (1958); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.341-.348 (1960);
those agencies most directly affected are the United States Tax Court, 68A Stat. 884
(1954), 26 U.S.C. § 7453 (1958); 26 C.F.R. § 701.2 (1961); the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, 49 Stat. 1987 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1114(b) (1958); 46 C.F.R. § 201.26 (1963);
the General Accounting Office, 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 52 (1958); 4 C.F.R. §§
1.1-1.8 (1961); and the Veterans Administration, 49 Stat. 2031 (1936), 38 U.S.C. §§
3401-05 (1958); 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.626-.663 (1957).
